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In many respects, Indian lands in the US can be considered to be a country within a country. With
many tribal governments having their own law enforcement agencies there is a risk of jurisdictional
conflict with agencies outside of Indian Country. Thaddieus W. Conner and Stephanie L. Witt take
a close look at cross-deputization agreements between law enforcement agencies which allow
officers from tribal, state, and local agencies to actively respond to issues regardless of jurisdictional
boundaries. They find that the major determinants of such cooperation are the presence of Indian
gaming, higher rates of violent crime, as well as organizational resources and capacity. 
There are more than 300 federally recognized Native American tribal governments in the contiguous
United States today, with jurisdiction over about 1 million people. These tribal governments often
have their own courts and law enforcement; more than half of all tribal governments which have law
enforcement agencies have entered into cross-deputization agreements with neighboring non-tribal
governments to administer justice more efficiently and effectively across jurisdictions. Cross-
deputization agreements allow law enforcement officers from tribal, state, and/or local law
enforcement agencies to actively respond to issues regardless of jurisdictional boundaries. Without
such agreements, determining who has jurisdiction in Indian Country is fraught with complexity due in large part to
the sovereign rights of tribes that predate the US Constitution and the “discovery” of the Americas.
Cross-jurisdictional agreements between tribal and non-tribal law enforcement agencies help bring actors together
to overcome a long history of conflict; discovering collaborative solutions to common problems. However, few
studies have explored what drives cooperation between tribal and non-tribal officials in the US, with tribal
governments becoming an increasingly active player in the intergovernmental relations framework. We attempt to fill
this void by examining how capacity, problem severity, and economic development helps explain the adoption of
cross-jurisdictional agreements between tribal, state, and local law enforcement agencies using data provided by
the Bureau of Justice Statistics.
One major determinant of cross-jurisdictional cooperation between tribes and local governments in the area of law
enforcement is the presence of Indian gaming. Since the signing of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in 1988, more
than 200 tribal governments have adopted Class III “Las Vegas style” gaming that includes high stakes table games
such as poker and blackjack as well as electronic slot machines. Both positive and negative impacts are associated
with gaming including increases in income and employment on tribal land in the case of the former, and perceived
increases in crime and addiction in the case of the latter. The dramatic increase in tourism and visitors to many
Native nations requires an increased presence of tribal law enforcement to help maintain law and order. As a result,
we find a higher likelihood of cooperation between tribal and neighboring non-tribal governments in the presence of
Class III casinos. Given that the challenges associated with an increase in patrons to Native communities often
transcend a single jurisdiction, collaboration between tribal and non-tribal law enforcement personnel would appear
to provide a window of opportunity for intergovernmental cooperation that might not materialize under other
conditions.
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Another central determinant of intergovernmental partnerships between tribal and non-tribal law enforcement
agencies is the presence of organizational resources and capacity. Non-tribal jurisdictions with diminished capacity
in the way of insufficient numbers of personnel and lower spending on law enforcement per capita are more likely to
enter into a cooperative agreement with tribal law enforcement in the immediate area than states and counties with
greater organizational capacity. This reflects a very strategic decision on the part of state and local actors who may
lack the capital necessary to accomplish specific tasks and are willing to share jurisdiction in order to more
effectively achieve their goals. Conversely, we find that tribes with cross-deputization agreements with neighboring
local law enforcement tend to be much better off socioeconomically than tribes without agreements. Deputized
tribes would thus appear to be providing an important service to surrounding non-Indian communities that may need
assistance.
Finally, problem severity also plays a role in determining the extent to which actors will seek out other agencies in
the external environment to work together. Collaboration often surrounds what are referred to as “wicked problems,”
or problems that lack easy solutions, which often defy the ability of a single organization to address alone. In such
policy areas, collaboration is much more likely as single actors scan the external environment for help in solving
seemingly intractable problems. We find this to be the case in explaining tribal-local law enforcement partnerships
where there is a higher likelihood of adopting cross-deputization agreements in states and counties with high rates
of violent crime. This relationship is significant even when controlling for the size and capacity of the law
enforcement agencies in the state. As a result, problem severity appears to be an important catalyst in facilitating
intergovernmental partnerships between tribes and non-tribal actors in the United States.
Our work provides an important glimpse into what drives cooperation in Indian Country, but more is needed to fully
understand how these factors influence cross-jurisdictional partnerships in other policy areas involving tribal
governments including health policy, economic development, environmental regulation, and even education. Such
partnerships can help overcome a history of conflict between Native nations and state governments that have
served as barriers to progress in finding joint solutions to common problems.
This article is based on the paper, ‘The Role of Capacity and Problem Severity in Adopting Voluntary
Intergovernmental Partnerships: The Case of Tribes, States, and Local Governments’, in State and Local
Government Review.
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